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Abstract— The study looks into the viability of reform politics 
in Cebu’s traditional political field.  This traces how politicians 
labor to assert and institutionalize political settlements such as 
“diskarte” or rationalization and legitimacy of position.   The 
researcher found out three sources of political “habitus” 
[Bourdieu’s appropriation of political structure and political 
culture] that formed part of Cebu City’s political institutions, 
namely:  a.) the gatekeepers who are reform-grassroots-petty 
politicians at the barangay level; b.) the public interest 
articulators at the Sangguniang Panglungsod (City Council) 
level; and the c.) Archetypes who are trapo aristocratic 
politicians competing for the seat of mayor at the city executive 
office. 
The researcher presents six (6) purposively chosen gate 
keepers known as reform-grassroots-politicians at the barangay 
level; three (3) public interest articulators at the city council, and, 
three (3) mayors contesting for the city’s seat of power -- the 
executive office in the local government unit of Cebu City.   The 
researcher assessed each one according to their narratives as 
politicians, their distinctive identity claims, their views on Cebu’s 
political dynamics and political norm, their annual revenue 
generation and budgetary allocations and their understanding on 
the following institutions: a.) the cabo system (system of 
enrolment under specific patrons), b.) the lansaderas (ballot 
switching schemes during elections) and the c.) inangayan (vote 
buying system). 
The study shows that the “habitus” of the aforementioned 
three institutions [gate keepers, public interest articulators, and 
archetypes] are so inter-twined that the whole field cannot 
operate independent from any one of them. However, for the 
purpose of this paper, the habitus of the gate keepers is focused. 
In the paper, the three habitus have a hybridized multiplicity of 
complex structure-culture-nexus now distinctively operative in 
Cebu City’s political field that have reforms rooted only at the 
grassroots level and not yet embedded in the entire structure of 
the political order.   
Neo-patrimonialism is still present although held in control 
due to the pressures from the grassroots below who constantly 
assert the legitimacy of political change in terms of  assets 
reforms and assets redistribution.  Meanwhile the go-between 
public interest articulators stay at the middle ground in the tug-
of-war between reforms and neo-patrimonial archetypal and 
traditional politics.    
I. INTRODUCTION
        Why are reform-oriented grassroots leaders engaging in 
the murky and violent world of traditional politics?  Political 
bargaining between elites is often seen as an effective strategy 
for avoiding electoral violence and winner-take all outcomes 
in local politics. These political settlements have also been 
critical in securing political legitimacy and stable political 
authority for local elites.  However, in recent years reform-
oriented village-level leaders have used similar bargains to 
advance their interests and advocacies, in some instances 
challenging traditional politicians in local elective positions in 
city-wide and municipal councils. Fueled in part by successful 
collective action at the barangay level, these grassroots 
leaders have arguably transformed the political landscape in 
Cebu province starting from the 1990s and are now seen as 
key actors in the evolution of “new politics” in the province. 
        Have these engagements caused a significant shift in 
patterns of rule? Are they genuine ruptures from trapo politics 
or more of the same, and can it be sustained?   This study 
examines provincial politics in Cebu and the emergence of a 
new type of reform politics “from below” that is seen to 
challenge the entrenched interests of traditional politicians in 
ways dissimilar from the past. Traditional politics, popularly 
referred to as trapo politics, has continued to hold sway in 
varying forms in the province since the post-war period, and 
more recently, in the post-Marcos period. [1]  Recent years 
have seen the rise of new-type political leaders who do not 
come from the same powerful families or clans that lorded 
over the province, employing new forms of patronage and 
reciprocity to generate adherence from local citizens. They 
established their political authority by adhering to a 
combination of strongman rule, patrimonial politics, and 
“good governance” institutions that strengthened their 
“legitimate domination” over local politics (Weber  
1954).   
[1]Trapo, a neologism for “traditional politics” is characterized by the 
corruption and despotism of old oligarchic political dynasties after a colonial 
legacy of patron-client-machine politics and personalistic rule (Hutchcroft and 
Rocamora 2003; Sidel 1999; Kawanaka 1996).  The term has become popular 
because it also refers in the vernacular to a dirty rag, and thus becomes a 
derisive connotation for the entrenched unscrupulous culture of 
patrimonialism in local politics.
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This phenomenon is the subject of this study. The research 
is situated within the current scholarship on the nature of 
political transitions and the construction of political rule and 
authority at the subnational level. It documents the 
transformation of grassroots leaders into effective and 
accountable public officials at various levels. The study 
revisits relevant concepts from previous studies on Philippine 
local politics including political legitimacy, strongman rule, 
patronage politics, and responsible governance, among others.  
A. Background of the Study
Cebu province hosts the biggest voting population among
all provinces in the country making it attractive to the eyes of 
national politicians. The country’s major political parties 
regularly court local political leaders to gain political 
dominance in this vote-rich territory. 
As of Census Year 2010, Cebu City alone had a total 
population of 866,171 persons based on the National Statistics 
Office (NSO) 2010 Report. In terms of political l subdivision, 
Cebu City has eighty (80) barangays (divided between the 
North and South Districts), comprising three hundred and six 
(306) puroks.  There are thirty-four (34) urban l and coastal
barangays with large voting populations. Getting the majority
votes in these barangays could very well deliver electoral
victory to candidates who seek political control of the city.
In particular, the votes cast in the densely populated urban 
and coastal barangays at the Cebu reclamation area and the 
South Road Properties alone could win the seat to any 
candidate for the mayoralty position.   
The Cebu City Government is made up of offices of 
mayor, vice mayor, and sixteen (16) city councilors. The 
sixteen council seats are equally divided between the two 
districts of Cebu.  
        The first signs of a “reform politics” emerged in the early 
1960s when the Cebu City’s political scene saw the emergence 
of political advocacies calling for more access to basic 
services and greater accountability among local politicians that 
was introduced by a church movement called the “Basic 
Christian Communities  Community Organizing (BCC-CO)” 
The movement harnessed local leaderships from the ranks of  
See Figure 1:  Map of Cebu City, source: www.dpwh. gov.ph. 
urban poor who engaged in plain discourse on basic issues like 
water and power supply and non-basic issues like construction 
of foot paths and installation of drainage systems.    
Extraordinarily, came Ferdinand Marcos, an Ilocano 
legislator who rose from the fringes of Philippine oligarchy. 
Marcos reversed the pattern of the usual cacique democracy 
that was founded on the American context of “rule of law” by 
using the state as instrument of political power (Anderson 
1995).  Hence, it was the constitutional suspension of the writ 
of “habeas corpus” and the Marcosian imposition of martial 
law in 1972 that precipitated the proliferation of mass 
movements.  Progressive groups were subjected to repression. 
Professionals, students, farmers, workers, and vendors who 
belonged in progressive organizations active in the anti-
dictatorship movements were either summarily executed or 
arrested by the military. In the early stages of military rule, all 
attempts at political organizing work were outlawed by the 
State. The enactment of the anti-squatting law (PD No. 772) in 
1975 paved way to the formation of the Panaghugpong sa 
Kabus nga Tagadakbayan (PANAG).  As a result of political 
persecution and repression of members of progressive groups, 
many activists went underground during these years. But it 
was the church-based groups, functioning as non-government 
organizations (NGOs), that were the first to engage in 
community organizing in Cebu City at the height of martial 
law. These groups included the Task Force Detainees of the 
Philippines (TFD), and the Share-and-Care Apostolate for 
Poor Settlers (SCAPS) of the diocesan Catholic Church. 
In the latter part of martial law, other NGOs helped expand 
grassroots activities in Cebu City. There was the Philippine 
Ecumenical Council for Community Organization (PECCO) 
that expanded community organizing (CO) all over the 
country, combining Marxist structural analysis and the 
strategies made popular by Saul Alinsky and Paolo Freire. 
Instead of railing against national issues and opposing 
repressive rule, local concerns such as water, power, 
sanitation, path ways, and paved roads and their links to larger 
issues such as education, health, and housing were used as 
entry points for organizing. Various political groups such as 
the underground organizations of the Left saw the value of 
establishing their own open and legal organizations to 
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influence the programs and projects of existing ones and 
redirect these to national issues such as martial law and 
corruption.  It cannot be denied that the most effective NGOs 
of the period were those whose leaders and staff pursued 
ideological and political interests. However, competing 
ideological persuasions eventually led to organizational splits 
and rivalries among various civil society organizations.  
As mass actions intensified, more urban poor communities 
were organized. This development threatened entrenched 
“trapo” interests as more urban poor groups could now be 
mobilized in protest actions against inequities in public office. 
Up to this day, however, traditional politics, which in varying 
forms dominated the island from the post-colonial period 
through the recent post-Marcos period, has nevertheless 
continued to hold sway in Cebu. Recent years also saw the 
emergence of new-type local political leaders who did not 
belong to traditional political families or clans but who 
nonetheless gained voters’ adherence through political 
patronage.  There were also an emerging breed of politicians 
who gained political ascendancy through sheer combination of 
strongman rule, patrimonial and machine politics, and the use 
of “good governance” discourses to strengthen their legitimate 
domination over local politics.  
In Cebu City, former leaders of informal settlers affiliated 
with the umbrella organization known as the Panaghugpong sa 
Kabus nga Tagadakbayan (Confederation of Urban Poor 
Dwellers), positioned themselves in active political offices in 
various barangay government units. In the 1970s and the 
1980s, they were active in organizing a series of worker 
strikes and other mass actions through a combination of street 
protests, mass student and workers walk outs, and transport 
strikes. Today, with the support of grass root families who 
helped to vote them into office, they are already holding 
elective posts at the level where it counts most--the barangay 
level. They may be situated at the village level, but they are 
adept at securing bargains with local elites and have become 
active players in the local political landscape that used to be 
dominated by traditional politicians.  
These new-type of politicos articulate a wider set of 
interests.  They use a discourse of change that calls for 
participation of people belonging to the marginalized sectors, 
such as the labourers, poor households, and women. They 
made the delivery of basic social services the priority over 
infrastructure projects. Apart from attending ribbon-cutting 
ceremonies as traditional politicos often do, they are also 
distributing subsistence goods, medicines, housing materials, 
and basic necessities. Above all, they engage in advocacies for 
redistributive reforms in land, taxes, and services.  
What have these leaders accomplished by shifting the basis 
of their legitimacy and authority from grassroots-level action 
and mobilization to electoral politics? What were the factors 
that caused the shift in the patterns of political participation? 
Finally, should this pattern be seen as a genuine shift from 
trapo politics or, is it more of the same? Can these be 
sustained?  
B. Political transitions in the Philippines
Colonial Politics and the Post-War Period 
Traditional politics in the Philippines traces its roots in the 
colonial politics cultivated and reinforced by Spanish and 
American authorities. The Spanish system of patrimonial 
politics and the American system of elite democracy had 
combined to embed a system of political domination that 
featured strong patronage relations expressed in representation 
through elections. 
The Philippine colonial experience introduced a kind of 
politics that had paved the way for the entrenchment of self-
interested, corrupt, and repressive political leaders. The 
colonizing state offered a lot of incentives and privileges that 
induced ambitious politico-economic entrepreneurs to engage 
in business enterprises that utilized political connection and 
protection, and to adopt patronage practices to sustain their 
rule. Taylor (1968:76) in Huntington’s Political Order in 
Changing Societies writes:  
 “Politics is a major industry among Filipinos; it is a way 
of life.  Politics is the main route to power, which in turn is the 
main route to wealth… More money can be made in a shorter 
time with the aid of political influence than by any other 
means.”   
Public office in the Philippines is derived from a colonial 
legacy of patron-client relations, machine politics, 
patrimonialism and "bossism" that thrived within the country’s 
brand of democratic politics, specifically in such mechanisms 
such as the party system and the electoral system (Sidel 1999). 
The environment has effectively attracted the local elite to 
express their power and authority through electoral politics 
and the practice of democracy through institutions that 
sustained the American colonial project. Native leaders and 
local political groups are pitted against each other 
(Lande1965). Recruitment to political parties and the ascent to 
leadership positions in public service induce collaboration, 
competition and bargaining among politicians.  
Scholars such as Lande (1968), Constantino (1975) and 
May (1984) postulate that these patterns of governance that 
were embedded under American rule were ritualistically 
turned over to members of the Philippine elite who originally 
came from the privileged classes from which the Ilustrados 
originated (Corpuz 1957; Kerkvliet 1985; 1990; Simbulan 
2005). 
Under this patronage system, government administrative 
positions are gained not through professional competence or 
civil service eligibilities but through inter and intra-elite 
bargaining. Rents are distributed and conflicts are avoided 
through political arrangements established through 
personalistic forms of relations within closed social and 
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political networks dominated by elite interests (Michel 1911; 
Taylor 1968). Powerful local elites leveraged both their 
educational backgrounds and social positions to justify their 
rule over the poor majority (McCoy 1993; Kerkvliet 1990). 
In rural areas the landed elite accumulated wealth and 
power through control over large tracts of land that served the 
export market for agricultural products such as sugar and 
copra. They also benefited from state subsidies and 
protectionist policies served to dampen and delay the drive to 
modernize agriculture and enabled them to profit from the 
simple production of raw materials for export. To correct this 
anomaly, several attempts at comprehensive redistributive 
land reform were made only to be consistently blocked by big 
landowners.  A series of half-baked measures were likewise 
undertaken, starting with the supposed redistribution of public 
lands mostly in Mindanao by the National Land Settlement 
Administration (NLSA), Land Settlement Development 
Corporation (LASEDECO), or the National Resettlement and 
Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA). The result of all 
these bureaucratic experiments was to further delay the 
redistribution of land, particularly those lands grabbed from 
farmers who were victims to the practice of the colonial 
inquilinato system.[2] Another aspect of colonial and post-
colonial rule was to stifle the rise of insurgent movements by 
resettling landless farmers from Luzon and the Visayas to 
distant places in the South such as Sarangani, and Basilan in 
Mindanao (Corpus 1997). 
The dominance of local elites in public office could be 
gleaned from the long political career of Sergio Osmeña Sr. A 
Cebu-born mestizo and prominent member of one of Cebu’s 
elite families, he epitomized the classic colonial “politico” as 
provincial governor of Cebu from 1904 to 1906 during the 
Filipino-American War. He was also the governor of the 
Province of Cebu during the Japanese occupation of the 
Philippines.   He served as Senator of the Philippine National 
Assembly after the Japanese War and was later elected Vice 
President of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1944-1946.  In 
spite of the ravages of war, his political control and influence 
in the province was sustained by his son’s ascension to the 
political throne. Sergio “Serging” Osmeña, Jr. won the 
gubernatorial post in the 1951elections against Mariano 
Cuenco, the candidate of a rival elite political family. [3] The 
Cuencos at the time enjoyed the support of the Duranos, 
another powerful political family who ruled the mid-Northern 
district of Cebu. Through the practice of machine politics, 
Osmeña Jr. rose to become the second Osmeña to lord it over 
the Cebu Province within a generation.  After four years as 
provincial governor, Osmeña Jr. was also elected as Cebu City 
Mayor from 1955 through 1963, holding the office for three 
consecutive terms.  He made a presidential bid against 
Ferdinand Marcos in 1965 but had lost in the elections 
reportedly marred by massive fraud. In Cebu alone for 
instance, the political districts that were part of the Durano 
bailiwick had delivered their vote banks to Marcos.  
Over time the dominance of colonial politicos had 
induced massive social unrest and intense political rivalry 
among the elites that led to the creation and maintenance of 
private armies by rival politicians, acting as warlords, who 
often demonstrated violent claims at the center of political 
power in Cebu. Elite politics hardly contained the violent 
inter-elite struggles for control of political office. Meanwhile, 
a wave of repressive policies were enforced targeting nascent 
social struggles such as labor protests and millenarian 
movements. As early as the 1900s Sergio Osmeña, Sr. had 
criminalized local peasant groups, accusing them of being 
outlaws (Sy 1996; Freeman Daily 1919;Sturtevant 1976). 
The entrenchment of trapo politics in Martial Law 
The old system of elite politics and patronage that failed to 
contain the political competition in the pre-martial law years 
was interrupted by the declaration of martial law in 1972 by 
then President Ferdinand Marcos. The political rhetoric of the 
“strong state” and “new society” was foisted on elite groups 
and civil society through the concentration of political power 
under one-man rule.  
Cronyism became the route to political office and 
economic wealth, giving birth to the period of “booty 
capitalism”—a modernizing economy where members of a 
systematic oligarchy take turns in looting the resources of the 
state for their own benefit (Hutchcroft 1998).  While one-man 
rule enabled the development of a “strong state bureaucracy” 
(Sidel 1999), it also led to rampant corruption and 
international debts — especially as massive subsidies and 
investments in infrastructure were bankrolled by international 
financial institutions.  
As huge debt and the economic crisis followed, the 
economic foundations of martial law started to disintegrate 
and the system of elite and crony politics was severely 
weakened. Members of the economic and political elite later 
joined the fight against the dictatorship that culminated in the 
fall of the Marcos regime in 1986. The prominent role that the 
elites played in ending strongman rule had given rise to the 
restoration of trapo politics under the guise of the new 
discourse of democratization and good governance. 
Post-1986 elite politics 
Traditional politics did not end with the downfall of 
Marcos. Kerkvliet and Mojares (1991) argued that entrenched 
political families who were in power years before and during 
the Marcos regime had managed, by means fair or foul, to 
remain in office and to continue enjoying political and 
economic pre-eminence in their bailiwicks. The authors 
further assert that the practice of authoritarianism did not end, 
but had grown worse instead, as power, both political and 
criminal in nature began to reassert itself among new poltical 
elites—including those who had distinguished themselves in 
the struggle against the Marcos fascist regime (Kerkvliet and 
Mojares 1991). 
[2]From the Spanish term “Inquilino” that refers to a worker of a colonial 
landed estate who is usually given the use of a small plot of land, implements,
seed, and a small wage in return for his labor.  The existing system is referred
to as the “Inquilinato Sytem” (Agoncillo 1990; Constantino 1975).
[3]Some studies show that Osmena engaged in war-related enterprises that 
enabled the clan to secure its powerful economic and political position prior to 
the conflict (Mojares 1985).
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However, the EDSA revolt that toppled Marcos had 
“modernized” the system of trapo rule in the country 
(Tancangco 1988 and Rocamora 2000).  A consequence of the 
restoration of elite democracy is seen in the rise of “political 
bossism,” which mandated the cultivation of networks within 
civil society equivalent to those nurtured with the economic 
and political elites (Sidel 1999). The restoration of elite 
patronage politics came with the same sordid components that 
characterized traditional politics in the pre-martial law period. 
Bribery and corruption continue to grow, masked as culturally 
acceptable forms of “gift-giving” to cronies and their families, 
close friends, and allies.  It included the practice of awarding 
business contracts, or elective and appointive posts in public 
office to election financiers, leaders, and supporters.  
Although new clans and political networks superseded 
some powerful political players of the past, the old patron-
client politics survived the martial law years. However, more 
recent developments indicate that a different strand of politics 
has emerged, and largely as a result of the role played by a 
network of grassroots organizations that played a significant 
role in the fight for human rights and democratization and the 
toppling of the Marcos regime. This sort of politics departs 
significantly from the classic brand of trapo politics by 
inserting redistributive and reform-oriented goals with the use 
of popular mobilization and patronage. 
Evolution of reform politics 
Philippine politics gradually developed  new perspectives 
of leadership given the series of political changes the  
nation have experienced at certain historical conjunctures such 
as  the Propaganda Movement, the Katipunan-led Revolution, 
the Filipino-American War, the formation of the First 
Philippine Republic, and the Third Republic. The Marcos 
regime, facing massive protests that culminated in EDSA I, 
gave rise to the clamor for new variants of politicians in the 
political field.  The nation witnessed political cleavages that 
facilitated political change by way of continuing massive 
resistance and social movements.    
Civil disobedience and the practice of “people power” 
placed the Philippines on the international political map.  The 
revolutionary government of Corazon C. Aquino appointed 
left-leaning personalities from the ranks of civl society to 
serve the government under her administration. Many of them 
were appointed to national, regional and local government 
posts, and also in the judicial and legislative departments. 
Initially moved by a desire to use government power and 
authority to effect socio-political change, many of them 
accepted and even sought government posts. When the first 
post-EDSA elections came in 1987, many from the 
progressive ranks, who thought their mass base is strong 
perceived popularity were enough to make them win in the 
elections, sought elective positions. Thus, it was EDSA, at a 
time when the country’s political atmosphere was less hostile 
to the leftist participation in mainstream politics, that opened 
the political arena to various reform-oriented and progressive 
political participants. EDSA moved them  to enter the realm of 
political leadership by way of elections.  For the first time, in 
more than two decades of centralized authoritarian rule, these 
new reform-oriented progressives "joined the game" in the 
Philippine political field.  The question is how this new breed 
of politicians carried with them the banner of political reform 
that could change the substance and trajectory of politics.  
C. New politics via emergent grassroots oriented reform
politicians
When traditional politics was still in vogue, none of the big
trapos would deign to seek, much less hold barangay level 
positions. Their social and economic stature and the winner-
take-all nature of Philippines politics drove them to higher 
political office, with municipal and city council and mayoral 
posts representing the bottom line of their political ambitions. 
Meanwhile, most of the local barangay officials were small-
time village leaders, who were oftentimes the encargados 
[administrators] of lands owned by absentee landlords, 
merchant proprietors, or rice and corn mill owners, who were 
in turn the clients of big local politicians.  Professing loyalty 
to these politicians, they served as nodal points in 
consolidating the electorate at the local level, and were 
expected to broker the delivery of votes of their constituents 
via the cabo system. 
After the fall of the Marcos regime a group of political 
reformers began to participate in the murky and violent world 
of electoral politics in Cebu. They were distinctively different 
from the traditional politicians due to their social and 
economic origins and their experience in pressure politics. 
(Sidel 1999, Cullinane 1998, and Mojares 1998).    
Evidence from the field shows the evolution of new 
political leaders who do not come from the previous neo-
patrimonial, patriarchal, and clientelistic-warlord political 
networks in the province of Cebu. They are not similar to the 
connectivities which Sidel (1999) described as supra-
municipal structures of small town and district bosses and 
provincial patrons. These rising politicians push for change 
and articulate the interests of marginalized sectors including 
issues of women, labor, and poor community welfare, access 
to basic social services of communities, and ecological 
concerns. They do not push for huge infrastructure projects. 
They initiate mass distribution of measured quantities of basic 
materials that respond to felt and articulated needs in the 
community. These goods include subsistence commodities 
(rice and dried fish) which address basic needs for food, 
medicine, housing materials (nipa shingles and GI sheets), and 
other basic amenities (mosquito nets and blankets). 
Rather than imposing TOP-DOWN programs and projects, 
these grassroots leaders are known for conducting regular 
consultations with their poor constituents, and in promoting a 
more inclusive collective community development agenda. 
They do not possess the means nor the capacity to engage in 
patronage politics. More importantly, they are associated with 
advocacies such as genuine asset reforms and redistribution 
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that have earned them the hostility of big land owners, 
corporations, and traditional politicians. 
D. The research problem, objectives, and hypothesis of the
study
Research problem 
This study problematizes the dynamics of political change 
in Cebu City’s local politics in terms of the shift of leadership 
from trapo to reform politicians at the grassroots level. The 
study analyzes the experiences of reform politicians or of 
individuals who rose to leadership in the Cebu political field 
outside of the regular and traditional patterns of entry. The 
study is a critical assessment of the leadership structure and 
culture of the different types of politicians in local Cebuano 
political offices in the city government and barangays, as well 
as the viability of this leadership transformation. 
How did they emerge and what interests do they represent? 
Will they become a permanent fixture of local politics in Cebu 
and other provinces in the Philippines?    
These new-type actors in the Cebuano political field do not 
trace their lineage to the wealthy and powerful paterfamilias
of the province. They are not the subjects of big traditional 
politicians i.e.,‘encargado,’ or tenants in the farms owned by 
traditional politicians. They come from a variety of 
backgrounds, ranging from marginalized basic sectors, i.e., 
urban poor settlers, street vendors, media professionals, 
human rights activists, middle class professionals and even 
members of the labor sector.  Their ideological orientation and 
characteristics differ from those of traditional politicians.  
Objectives of the study 
The study is an analysis of “reform politicians” and 
“reform politics” in the province of Cebu. The study examines 
the evolution of new actors and institutions at the subnational 
level, the interests they represent, and their origins, 
characteristics, and approaches.   The study shall distinguish 
“reform politics” from traditional politics in the province, and 
determine whether new practices and new institutions 
introduced in the field by reform politicians have actually 
produced substantial economic, social, and political change.  
The study aims to contribute to the literature on Cebuano 
politics in particular, and Philippine local politics in general, 
and provide new narratives that explain emerging forms of 
political leadership and political change. The study attempts to 
contribute to the field of political sociology by explaining 
WHY the political force for genuine change in Cebuano 
politics comes from grassroots reform politicians.  
Research hypothesis 
In addressing the abovementioned question, the study aims 
to identify the conditions that have led to a shift in actors and 
the strategies they employed, and whether these will 
significantly alter the nature and characteristics of politics in 
Cebu. Finally, the study reviews the implications of this 
emerging form of politics on the wider local political arena in 
the country.  The study hypothesizes that these new actors will 
contribute to enduring political change in Cebuano politics 
and will be able to entrench themselves in the local political 
field, eventually tilting the balance of power in favor of their 
poor and marginalized constituents.  
II THE PLIGHT OF REFORM POLITICIANS IN CEBU’S 
TRADITIONAL POLITICS 
This chapter provides the final mapping of the whole 
picture of the study.  How the political game has been in place 
and how Cebuano political structures and political culture 
interlock into one logical field or space called the Cebuano 
Political field.  And from these premises, the lenses used in the 
conduct of the study is reassessed and juxtaposed with the 
objective distinction of the field where it is applied and at the 
same time the theory is extended into new ramifications and 
juxtaposed with parallel theories where it can be reassessed in 
terms of applicability in method and context.   Finally, the 
Cebuano political field is rendered and understood in the way 
it is structured, shaped and embossed in the overall social field 
and the reasons why it is so.
1.) The three political habitus
The study shows Cebu politics as a hybridized sub-
national native political norm with a hue of the formal colonial 
“legal” bureaucracy, explained as a combination of nativism 
and xenophilia of local political dynamics of a.) gate keepers, 
b.) public interest articulators and c.) archetypes.  This is 
shown in their command of machines or of organized bodies 
of supporters, of tactical alliances, their power sharing 
capabilities, their kind of coalition building and their tolerance 
on organized opposition. But all these are only made possible 
through the mandate provided in R.A. No. 7160 otherwise 
known as the Local Government Code (LGC) serving as the 
constraining and enabling mechanism in place for local 
government units. 
Here are three (3) types of political habitus otherwise 
known as political institutions that exist and are contesting for 
power in the Cebuano Political field. These are the Reform-
Grassroots-Politicians or reform gatekeepers for brevity; the 
Public Interest Articulators or articulators and the Trapo 
Archetypes or archetypes.  Parallel to Sidel’s work are three 
types of politicians according to the political division of labor 
in the city that are namely, those in the level of the barangay 
local governance, the Sangguniang Panglungsod (City 
Council) and the city executive office as the three major 
structures in the Cebuano political field.   
2.) Multiplicity and hybridity 
So, here comes now the resonance of multiplicity, and 
hybridity of political institutions in the Cebuano political field 
following a gradual unfolding of grassroots reformism 
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strongly in the actual community management structure the 
barangay level where they serve as service front liners, and at 
the city council level with the public interest articulators.  At 
the barangay level comes the norm of reform gate keepers in 
constant learning and innovation [adjusting to both local-
nativist form of “pagpangulo” or leadership and that of the 
colonial-rational legal bureaucracy of grand-office-
leadership].  On the other hand, articulators at the council, 
position themselves as mediators between the positions above 
them and those below them.  Then there are archetypes 
navigating through development diffusion as a form of 
political action to accommodate or not to accommodate all the 
forces below him including his rivals. 
In terms of leadership structure and culture of local 
Cebuano politics are the following three (3) types of 
leadership habitus evident in the political field prior to the 
elections in May 2013, namely:  
a.) The hybridized generative native structure and 
culture of reformgate keepers at the barangay level 
who originally started political leadership from the 
ranks of native local activists of the anti-Marcos 
movement.  
b.) The hybridized articulators who are negotiated by 
political families to join local traditional political 
parties.  
c.) And scions of ancient oligarchs who rose to politics 
as trapo archetypes and who competed in office for 
business interests in the city. 
3.) Trapo politics prevail: The Cabo, Lansaderas and 
Inangayan Systems 
The main menu here is the contest between three to two 
trapo archetypes while the rest align under each matrix of 
archetype. 
The field remains to be a game of trapo with prevalent 
practices of support from national patrons and then from 
national patrons to perks to trusted cabo, in order to operate 
the lansaderas and inangayan. One can speak of this norm of 
society particularly in elections.  Election period covers 
regular campaign period, the day of elections and canvassing 
time for results of elections.  It is Comelec who sets the actual 
date of elections and duration of campaign. 
What is observed in Cebu is that even prior to filing of 
candidacy and campaign period politicians already gear up 
themselves in hype for political positions.  They do not wait 
after filing of Certificates of Candidacy (COC) and actual 
campaign period.  
The Cabo system is the main institution in communities 
organized in matrices under political parties or candidate 
politicians of particular dynastic family names. Hence, the 
community organizations are under trapo archetype politicians 
who hold the purse of local and national parties contesting for 
slates in public office.  Cabo recruits and enlists followers 
from individual precinct voters who work within the 
organizational set up of local parties during campaign periods. 
Recruited poor voters operate the set-up of grand ballot 
switching and flying-voter-schemes defined as lansadera.   
Along these operations is embedded vote buying schemes 
where money is attached to sample ballots of line-up of 
candidates or names of politicians that will be copied into 
official ballots. This sample-ballot with money is folded in 
distinct manner inconspicuous to the ordinary eye.  It may also 
be inserted in an envelope and passed on to enlisted precinct 
voters pre-located in the community. This is called inangayan.  
Inangayan is the native way of reciprocation for effort 
spent to copy a sample ballot into the voter’s official ballot. 
The inangayan is a token of exchange for votes.  It is a form of 
money distribution as “a system of reciprocation and 
redistribution” from politicians who appeal to community-
folks to choose him as honored leader or choice public servant 
to sit in power.   For a politician, those who accept will in turn 
give him authority to take position of power to control and 
make use of public resources for a period depending on the 
position of power.  Amount paid for inangayan varies 
depending on the position of power and volume of resources 
at stake for a position of power that is vied for.
4.) All forms of capital 
 Warm bodies of voters - There are three forms of
capital in Bourdieu’s framework but may not
necessarily belong to only one individual in a certain
ladder or position of political power in the field.
Hence, for the reform gate keepers, their capital is
their ability to control and position at the heart of the
everlasting source of warm-bodies of voters  the
voting population in communities that serve as their
capital.
 Cultural capital is one’s academic or religious
standing in the community.  - For articulators, their
normative input to the field forms their cultural
capital.  They pose as articulate figures with ability to
negotiate and renegotiate between both native
barangay communities and big landlord dynastic
political families.  It is basic strategy they use to
position in the field.
 Economic resources - Cebu’s political archetypes
with command over material possessions  their
economic capital, or social connections in networks
of propertied upper class   their social capital, plus
their profession as cultural capital are all solid
grounds of power except for warm bodies of voters
controlled by reform gatekeepers and that ability to
articulate good interests before the poor like how the
interest articulators would do.
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5.) Political Dynamics 
The stakes here emanate from those variegated capital 
aforementioned in dynamic interplay in fields of contestation 
being tacit mechanisms.   
For reform gatekeepers political position is important to 
push for genuine asset redistribution for long awaited shares of 
resources after years of historical struggles.  For the 
articulators, their position next to archetypes is for them to 
climb to executive office too.  To be city mayor from ranks of 
articulators means power for power’s sake. And for the 
archetype trapos, the position of top executive in the City is 
decisive position to dispose of city resources for networks as 
enterprising institutions, and for profit such as the real estate 
business in brisk trade and commerce locally and 
internationally.  As it is, archetypes pursue their role as 
dynastic political families in the forefront of shaping a city’s 
politics and economy, institutionalizing its lead role as 
proprietor of local government being top land owners of the 
city. 
 Reform-grassroots-gatekeeper politicians (reform gate
keepers)
Here reform gate keepers are defined in terms of 
their narrativity and their social class, their tasks and 
functions, their ideological orientation, their notion of 
change in the political field, their endurance, and 
their electoral “diskarte”.  They are assessed in terms 
of their efforts or extent of fighting against patronage 
politics, and their identity claims being grassroots-
gatekeeper-politicians. They are also asked to give 
inputs on how they go about their particular role in 
the cabo system. 
 Public interest articulators (articulators)
Public interest articulators are likewise identified 
according to their feel for the Cebuano political 
terrain, their distinctive identity claims, their 
advocacies and their knowledge about the cabo 
system. 
Engagements of articulators are taken from the 
experiences of some city councilors who were a mix 
of poor yet progressive individuals who are not 
necessarily natives of Cebu City.  The study 
concludes that the cases here are from those lower 
middle class politicians who were coopted or given 
favors by traditional politicians, making them into 
some kind of odd progressive individuals now used 
to paint a progressive picture on local traditional 
political parties and then planted to participate in a 
line-up of political candidates as bearers of 
development agenda of traditional political families.   
These middle politicians are those categorized as 
articulators who are a combination of progressive 
individuals,two of whom are former social 
development workers and one, a son of an anti-
Marcos opposition leader.  They act as urban poor 
articulators, on one hand, and advocates for 
development for poor communities on the other. 
They promote and transform the needs of the poor 
into a rationalized market for social protection 
perceived to be commodities for sale.  In particular, 
they are capacitated to transform urban poor folks 
simply into a market segment for low cost housing or 
estate boom in the city.  
Public interest articulators in this study happen to 
be negotiated lower middle class professionals and 
articulate leaders who are not necessarily natives of 
the city but can push for political advocacies on 
sectoral issues without creating antagonistic 
mechanisms against business opportunities of the city 
properties designed by an archetype politician.  This 
is the doxa of public interest articulators. 
The articulators, are adept at social marketing of 
issues, are chosen and appointed by a particular 
sector to represent them in negotiations for their 
interests.  In some cases, politician-interest-
articulators stand as middle persons between the 
interests of poor household heads and the interest of 
proprietary classes. The poor needs public interest 
articulators because they need someone who has the 
authority to speak on their plight and negotiate with 
rich institutions and vice versa.   They also speak in 
behalf of the rich and haggle with the poor to give in 
to development plans envisioned by the rich. 
Meaning, the articulators, on the other hand, may 
stand as spokespersons of the rich families and that 
includes the circles of the archetype politician who 
sits as mayor.  They act as skilled operators in terms 
of bargaining for a middle ground between 
development technocrats who push for development 
construction projects or for the poor for basic 
amenities.  At times, they serve as adjunct agents for 
politicians’ business plans since the latter are 
regularly those landlord-realtor-archetype politicians. 
It is also the role of articulators to act as middleman 
between poor resident mass clients for low-cost 
housing, and the archetype who transforms 
government properties into objects of their profit 
schemes. 
There are three articulators purposively chosen in 
this study, namely:  Councilor Joey Dalus, Councilor 
Alvin Dizon and Councilor Nida Cabrera. The 
aforementioned are crucial sources of literature on 
“reform politicians” as articulators, of political norm 
concepts and of political dynamics that are decisive 
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to understand the Cebuano political field.  The study 
concludes how old families in Cebu City namely: 
Osmeña, Rama and Garcia manipulate and compete 
for resources or work for a “political grab” and how 
their “political grab” turns to be a modernization 
perspective for both economic power and economic 
growth in the city.     
 Trapo archetype and Cebuano pulitiko (archetypes)
On the other hand, with the leadership of the archetype
executive politician, one can see the matrices of families 
among three traditional political archetypes contesting for the 
seat of the executive in the Cebu City government. Its class 
position and proprietary character guarantees itself as local 
executive of the land.At the top is the field of political 
contestation between three traditional political archetypes that 
happens to be that of a “legalist,” a “cultural vissionary”, and a 
“realtor” in Cebu’s political field.   
These three politicians in Cebu City are engaged 
in a tug of war over the center of power, they being 
the protagonists in the contest for seat of Mayor of 
Cebu City.  They are: the incumbent mayor Michael 
Rama, former mayor Alvin B. Garcia and the former 
mayor and then representative Tomas dela Rama 
Osmeña of the second district of Cebu City.   
Traditional political archetypes are oligarchs in 
Cebu City.  Aside from the patterns of political 
history of Cebu City, the study concludes that these 
archetypes are the accepted models considered to be 
the rightful visionaries who plan and design 
development. They possess the social connections, 
cultural standing and the command of economic 
resources necessary to make them top executives of 
the city.  There appears to be an automatic and 
unspoken acceptance of this arrangement on top of 
the assumption in the community that these figures 
are guaranteed to deliver the goods when it comes to 
development of the city. These scions of local 
oligarchs are the ones who decide who shall take part 
in the enjoyment of the city resources and who shall 
live within the boundaries of city space.  They are the 
socially accepted power who, by virtue of 
possessions, control space and determine to whom 
space must be shared for economic exploitation. 
These archetypes have all the resources at their 
command because they belong to the ancient landed 
oligarchs that commenced at the old Parian district in 
Cebu City and whose business expanded to other 
parts of Cebu province, and even to the rest of the 
Visayan Islands and to the Mindanao region as well. 
6.) New-type politics: Reform grassroots politics 
 How did reform grassroots politicians emerge?
The Reform Gate Keepers 
Reform gatekeepers hail from the barangay native 
life-world.  The barangay has been the oldest political 
structure that is carried onward through time since 
ancient Filipino political institutions. Here are 
“grassroots leaders” who serve as reform politicians, 
and at the same time as gatekeepers who are veterans 
in social mass movements of the anti-Marcos 
activism during the 1960s through the 1970a and the 
1980s.  They are purposely chosen as sample sources 
of data on their habitus with a certain extent of 
“tenacity of principles and interests”.  They are the 
emerging reform political leaders pursuing the grand 
goal of assets reforms and assets redistribution for 
basic sectors of society at the village sphere.  
They are namely, former Busay barangay 
chairperson Eleodoro “Yody” Sanchez (now already 
Kagawad after the 2013 elections), Sambag II  brgy. 
kagawad Aurelio “Dondon” Jagmoc, brgy. Ermita 
kagawads Filicisimo “Imok” Rupinta and “Inday” 
Maria Ruiz Pino-Buanghug, Carreta brgy. kagawad 
Renato “Jun” Mabute (deceased in 2013) and  Pasil 
Brgy. kagawad Constantino “Boy” Ostulano.  All 
these grassroots barangay politicians are former mass 
leaders of the Panaghugpong sa Kabus nga 
Tagadakbayan (PANAG) an anti Marcos 
confederation of urban poor organizations since the 
1970s to the early 1990s.  Except for brgy. chair 
Eleodoro “Yody” Sanchez, who is from the student 
youth movement, petty middle class and former 
leader of the Student Catholic Action of the 
Philippines(SCAP) and League of Filipino  Students 
(LFS) at the Cebu Central Colleges. Sanchez 
happened to join first in politics through the 
kabataang barangay (KB) but lost the elections.  And 
then he is chosen SK leader in one of the Barangays 
in Cebu City also along his leadership in school. 
These “reform gatekeepers” are barangay level 
politicians.  Through collegial manner, they are 
assigned the task of gatekeeping.  They are the 
government personnel closest to the household of 
every citizen and every family residing in the 
barangays. Firstly, they are runners, and sooner, they 
become “kagawad” gatekeepers. Then gradually they 
become headman or village chief, gatekeeper and 
barangay chair. Being the closest individual to the 
daily lives of community folks and whose task is to 
foresee the redistributive welfare rights of basic 
society at the barangay village sphere, these petty 
officials then gradually became gatekeepers.   
The barangay reform gate keeper knows everyone 
in the barangay and monitors everyone to identify 
their needs and to deliver basic amenities and 
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services. The barangay reform gate-keeper-politician 
serves as a bridge for any party into the barangay 
community.  That means he who sits as gatekeeper 
has the skill to monitor entry of any outside force and 
not make anyone pass him by without his knowledge 
and tacit approval.  He is the eyes and ears of 
political groups who contrive to gain the confidence 
of voters in the village and the custodian of the 
barangay resource base.  The gatekeeper has control 
over the dispensation of community resources and 
takes note of the individuals who vie for power in the 
political field and whether their designs are beneficial 
or not to the common good inside the village sphere. 
Hence, these mechanisms serve as the realm of doxa 
for grassroots gatekeeper politicians. 
 What interest do these reform gate keepers represent?
These petty barangay politicians, are crucial to the 
emergence of an alternative form of power from 
grassroots leadership being the tradition of native 
Cebuano leadership of “pagpangulong 
banikanhon,”to mean leadership rooted from the 
basic community rather than leadership from the top 
colonial rational and legal bureaucracy only 
introduced in the early part of the 18th century 
Philippines.[4] 
Hence, the resulting contemporary political 
dynamics and norm in the barangay being 
propounded here, is but a legacy of a mix half-native 
and a half-colonial rational legal bureaucracy that 
operate now.  But this is historically rooted from the 
ancient nativistic structure of the barangay 
government.  This hybrid system of barangay or basic 
village governance now serves as cup-link between 
barangay as bearer of grassroots ranks and gatekeeper 
politicians [from the basic Cebuano communities] to 
that of grand high profile type of colonial bourgeois 
rational bureaucracy.  In a practical sense, it has 
developed local political practitioners from a social 
space that was historically appropriated to them as 
natives, or created from them a natural consequence, 
a logical course that fit to their everyday with ease. 
These politicians are honed progressively from 
experiences of both native welfare redistributive 
leadership and the training and orientation from the 
left anti-dictatorship movement from the 1960s to the 
1970s.   Some of them might also have sustained the 
embodied traditional leadership orientation of old, 
while others might have been influenced into the 
western teachings of contemporary and modern 
leadership norm, while the others have sustained 
praxis from past formations of progressive open-legal 
mass movements pursuing asset reforms through 
pursuing protest actions. 
 How widespread is their influence?
These purposively chosen sample grassroots 
reform gatekeepers are among the mass leaders who 
won elections as barangay politicians and who 
happened to have command on larger and decisive 
sectors in the city’s economy.  They are distinctively 
identified as active mass leaders of the progressive 
anti-Marcos mass movements in Cebu City in the 
past 20 or 30 years.  They are chosen on purpose as 
politician samples here because their historical 
participation in the progressive and militiant groups 
in Cebu City became a crucial force that got them 
embedded into the political structures.  They are 
honed by experience to fight against demolition 
squads and massive arson that eliminated poor urban 
households residing within large market areas if not 
in street alleys and traditional poor barangays in the 
city.  A large portion of grassroots politicians at the 
barangay level do not have the orientation and 
experiences of those purposively chosen in the study. 
These politicians are those who come from various 
walks of life who work with traditional orientation 
and inclination. The others who are simply traditional 
leaders, simply make politics a career in life. 
 Will they survive?
The reform gate keepers in this study can survive 
and sustain themselves, for as long as they remain 
relevant and indispensable to the political structure 
and culture; for as long as they pursue the character 
of the manggi-angayon (fair)and manggihatagon
(generous) kind of leader, or not the  dalo
(tightfisted) and the suwapang (miserly) type of 
person in the community; for as long as they can 
sustain as reform grassroots politicians whose prime 
function is at the heart of “resource redistribution and 
reciprocation” (which might be reinterpreted as 
clientelistic at some levels) but only particularly at 
the village sphere; and for as long as they remain 
effective being headmen or headwomen known as “ 
reform gatekeepers” for purposes of centricity and 
symmetry over the resource base in parity with the 
village population.   Other entry points into politics 
outside of this framework are regarded in this study 
as secondary or lesser in the degree of being reform 
politicians. 
 What challenges do they face?
A shift in leadership from trapo to reform gate 
keepers has taken place shortly, outside of regular 
patterns of entry. But reform gate keepers will still 
have to show who will truly prevail in the tug of war 
of power over the Cebuano political field.  Will that 
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be reform gate keepers or middle grounded 
articulators or archetype traditional politicians? A 
pattern cannot be proven as yet.  
It is noted that at the barangay level are the 
reformgate keepers who not only act as gatekeepers 
but who are also once exposed to or had a stint in the 
left mass movement.  Their consciousness is to 
pursue genuine representation for the basic masses 
and to call for assets redistribution for fellow poor 
residents.  This is not an easy task.  From these 
groups are community leaders whose interest is to 
achieve parity assets redistribution.  
 Will these emergent reform politicians get entrenched in
the Cebuano Political field or wane away? Why?
The role that grassroots petty politicians [reform 
gate keepers] portray is cut out for the village sphere 
level.  For as long as they sustain openness to 
neighborhood constituents and their household 
continue to be the source of centricity in the village 
sphere, these kinds of folks will surely sustain.  And 
if the parallel people’s organizations are likewise 
sustained in the community, such as the chapel 
organizations, and home-owners associations that are 
affiliate to the PANAG, and if the PANAG sustains 
the fight for land-issue in the city, then the number of 
these mass leader type who emerged from the social 
struggle for land will also continue to develop a 
larger number of these types of leaders who can 
articulate basic mass issues and later compete in local 
electoral positions in the barangay government.  
The basic limitation of barangay reform gate 
keepers is that it will only be at the level of the 
barangay where they can be elected as leaders.  Most 
local political analysts find this strange since the 
numbers mustered by kagawad Rupinta and former 
barangay chair Sanchez who ran for councilor in the 
2013 elections were not enough to install them at the 
city council. But same numbers were enough to 
sustain them at the barangay level in the October 
elections in 2013 
Finally, the structure of Cebu’s Political Field: 
 Are there changes in the political field?
The fact, sustains that political machines have 
been in place in Cebu City since the first historical 
elections in the Philippines that was implemented in 
1907.  It was the election for national assembly, and 
at the time, there were only the Osmeñas and 
Cuencos at the helm.  At the present the same family 
names prevail.  The Osmeñas are still here alive and 
kicking. Antonio Cuenco had retired from politics, 
but his son James, took his turn for hold of political 
position when he became Cebu City councilor in 
2013.  
The Cabo system is still sustained today, where 
most grassroots traditional gatekeepers as barangay 
politicians are attached to the matrix of patron 
archetype-politicians at the city level and likened to 
that of an umbilical cord where trapo power in office 
dies the moment ties connecting them to warm bodies 
of voters are severed. 
The cabo has been installed as an underground 
cheating machine that operates every election time. 
Gatekeepers are maintained and perform regularly in 
the field while their “amo” (to mean master or 
patron), the archetype politician, looks for funds to 
sustain their families so that their loyalty to the latter 
would remain.  
Lansadera ballot switching and the inangayan
vote buying system are among the schemes mastered 
by the cabo to deliver votes every election day, until 
a more systematic synchronization of statistics via 
comelec workers or officers could prepare election 
returns and pull off election “dagdag bawas” or vote 
padding efficiently.[5] 
City level politicians are also adept at all these, 
but some cabo leaders have come to detest the 
practice especially if the leaders have turned reform 
gate keeper politicians in the field after experiencing 
progressive activities with the left.  They decided 
they have to work harder to combat these schemes to 
topple a system that party politics of the old and rich 
political dynasts had institutionalized. Today, 
election protests articulate that automated election 
machines are allegedly embedded with patterns of 
biased source codes that rig votes and come as even a 
grander cheating system.   
E. Objectives and significance of the study
What are reasons behind the shift to new-type political
actors in the field that is from old-type trapo politics to reform 
gate keepers who are identified in terms of their 
characteristics, leadership orientation, and functions?  Why 
does the political force of change in Cebuano local politics 
come from grassroots reform politicians? 
[4]It was then later sustained in what  Glenn Anthony May (1984) calls “social 
engineering” of national, provincial, townships and barangay governance in 
the archipelago.  It is therefore, a kind of acculturation that resulted from the 
merging of traditional native political norms cum traditional native political 
dynamics withthe contemporary practice of colonial and rational bureaucracy 
in the Philippine context of governance. This can be called some kind of 
hybridized-native-colonial-bureaucratic style of leadership.
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 The basic village leader who acts as the person closest to
the household is found to be a better alternative for support
and source of information about the political activities of
the state.  They serve as effective messengers of boon or
bane to the community-folks. Usually, they are the persons
who are seen to be generous that, despite the economic
difficulties, they remain resourceful enough to share
whatever small bounty is delivered to the barangay hall.
What accounts for the emergence of new-type institution
in the local field with new-type actors’ distinctive political 
norm gradually accommodated into the Cebuano political 
field?    
 The reform gate keepers are real and meet the constituents
in the eye regularly, while the state is simply an abstract
entity and the congressman, mayor and city councilor are
but hazy, ephemeral figures to the community folk.  These
new-type politicians became successful lately because they
have mastered the acts of gradually bridging households to
government programs. They learned to be articulate as they
are gradually empowered to handle programs inside the
community through the new arrangement of the fiscal tasks
they handle.  They serve as go-between the household
residents and the big public officials at the city hall or that
of the district representative’s office.  They epitomize
community doers and nativistic humble leadership as
opposed to the grand politicians who glibly talk but could
not go down the village to sit and eat with their
constituents.
Why did reform strategies and tactics, or diskarte
associated to progressive politics recently earn head-way in 
public office?  
 These practices form part of the “habitus” of these kind of
gate keepers.  They are not orchestrated or dramatized.
Rather, they are patterns of regularity of norms that are
already embodied in the characters of village petty
barangay politicians [gate keepers].  “Diskarte” appears as
second nature to them as most of them truly hailed from
the community where they won as politician or public
leaders.  It does not come off as a pretense because they
also come from the same community where they serve and
their households are so close and connected to those of the
others in the barangay.  Besides, in every village sphere are
only few family names because most, if not, all of them are
relatives either by affinity or by consanguinity.  So that
normally, it would be easy for a homegrown politician to
know each one and approach anyone in the community.
Will these norms eventually come to superimpose itself in
the local political field? Why? 
 If assimilation to the colonial, grand and rational legal-type
bureaucracy prospers, and it becomes effective in
penetrating the core of a barangay government and
changing the aforementioned institution into a strict office-
type-rational-bureaucratic operations, in the process it will
also transform barangay governance to impersonal
businesswith neighbor- constituents who are treated as
plain rational citizens and no longer neighbors and kin.
This is not the culture of the Cebuano community.   In this
manner, petty politicians can no longer find time to go
down household to household.  It would then be impossible
to sustain these reform oriented politics now growing at the
local level whose consciousness is tied up to the
perspective of assets redistribution and pervasive
preference for what is familiar and real personalistic
support systems of households.
Why is it significant to have new-type politics and new-
type actors in to bring about political change in the local field? 
 It is significant because it means that the lowest level of
the political structure itself has gradually found the means
to resolve problems that have long confronted the village
sphere. It is the economic poverty of the basic village
sphere that is the main reason that new-type actors
evolved.  The continued economic poverty of the basic
structure [the barangay] is practically what leads to the
improvisation of leadership ethos in the field.  Likewise,
the continued difficulties of barangay governance and
barangay workers are what pushed local villagers to see
through the heart of the issues of governance amidst
poverty and graft and corrupt practices of higher
government bureaucracy.  Hence, this is what redefines
leadership and the support that is truly needed at this level.
Why does it have to be actors such as barangay grassroots
gate keepers in the Cebuano local politics that new type 
institutions have emerged?  Why is it a political change and 
social transformation that hail particularly from the grassroots 
type politicians? Why the shift in political norm, political 
dynamics and parity participation of leadership in public 
office?  Why the transformation and patterns of variations?  
 Actors at the barangay level have front stage and
back stage transparently open to the community.
They can be read and they are regularly seen.  It is
easy to catch a traitor at this level, whereas it would
be difficult to prove accusations of treachery against
extraneous actors with no native ties to the
community.  This shows that proximity is valued as
next to transparency.  The importance of proximity to
barangay constituents cannot be overemphasized.  It
is of utmost political value such that oftentimes it
turns up as a burning issue in many barangay
electoral campaigns. Proximity issues against a
politician who is perennially absent in his barangay
finds sarcastic expression in a Cebuano
[5]It is implied in the case of the Arroyo-Garci tape scandal and the patterns of 
election results in the past 10 elections where “dagdag bawas” was prevalent, 
and even the latest with the reputed 60-30-10 encoded PCOS machine 
program.
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saying“daling duolon apan lisud pangitaon”(easy to 
approach but difficult to find). Indeed, there are 
politicians in the community who are very 
approachable but because they are not always around 
they can never be reached anytime by their 
constituents.  The politician might be willing to help 
his constituents but his willingness is rendered futile 
by his absence, thereby negating to some extent, his 
readiness to serve the community when the need 
arises.  
Why the distinctive shift in the kind of political leadership 
and rhetoric particularly in terms of distinctive sources of 
leadership, characteristics, orientation and ideology, roles, 
tasks and functions, experiences, knowledge and skills? 
 Primarily, political settlements and elite bargains are
the major components of a politician’s legitimacy in
the field that form part of “doxa” as diskarteng
politika.  These political settlements and elite
bargains vary depending on the players who employ
the scheme (reform-grassroots gatekeeper politicians
to public interest articulators and to archetype
politicians).  These are the durable political actions
they engage in the field that define their characters
and marks in the political field.
 As to reform gate keepers, their political actions
appear to be the most durable in terms of real
delivery of public services as they are at the
frontlines of public service to the constituent
households at the felt-needs level.
The hybridized political culture is premised 
on the call for assets redistribution as the core of 
reform politics.  This is rooted in ‘gate keeping’ with 
the secrecy of the inangayan [vote-buying] and 
lansaderas [ballot switching] that fits Bourdieu’s 
concept of doxa.  Doxa here is the unspoken rules 
and norms in the game of politics, rules and norms 
that are integral to Cebuano society’s system of 
production of texts and narratives derived from its 
effective formulation of community-life stories.  In 
other words, political narratives of old are significant 
parameters that define the changing realities in the 
field of politics.  Likewise, it means what forces of 
change create new forms of literature and calls for a 
transformation of actors that in turn create 
transformation of the field or the structure of the 
social relations within it.    
Taken from Bourdieu, doxa is expressed in terms of  texts 
and narratives as best examples of means to measure what 
value and level of acceptance there is towards concepts like 
bag-ong pulitika [new politics]that eventually reflect back to 
society and struggle against movements of change.   The 
change or transformation in society also creates new forms of 
texts and narratives such as narratives on reform politics (as 
opposed to “trapo” politics), and that can be read in a society’s 
body of literature, that, in turn, influence the creation of its 
history.   
Particularly, at the barangay level, the subjective 
necessity of existence of reform grassroots gatekeeper 
politicians appears self-evident in its commonsense level of 
practice. For who would not ask for a portion of shared space 
when homelessness and poverty confront ones community? 
Consequently, it comes to be validated by objective consensus 
of political sense as it “goes without saying because it comes
without saying.” This is a culture or behavior embedded in the 
field as part and parcel of established and emerging political 
order (Bourdieu, 1960).  
Hence, in Cebu City are reform gate keepers whose 
experiences in community leadership were acquired from the 
collective life of less privileged dwellers in an urban center 
and whose day to day struggle is focused on the assertion for 
asset redistribution that is land for homeless dwellers, and 
basic social services for the poor such as public housing, 
public education and public healthcare.  The field gradually 
puts on record how grassroots-gatekeeper politicians focus on 
the day-to-day practice of delivery of social services to 
address what are described as felt needs of poor community 
dwellers.  The delivery of amenities is meant for the provision 
of social protection.  These were provided with the literature 
of old social movements of poor sectors during the Marcos 
regime.  The historical narratives on cries for land rights in the 
cities coupled with narratives on historical struggles for 
empowerment are embodied and have been embedded into the 
field as part of praxis.  What is now carved gradually into the 
old structure are concepts and praxis of reform grassroots 
political leaders, who are classified as new politicians entering 
into the field of the old trapo local political arena. 
Hence, the crucial part of the study is the establishment of 
patterns of literature on the emergence of the doxa of poor 
reform gate keepers.  The study accounts for conditions that 
lead to the emergence of reform gate keepers from the way 
they pursue and haggle for responses to the needs of 
constituents. These norms have resulted in the existence of a 
political practice that is an amalgam of both heterodox [trapo] 
and orthodox [reform] practices influencing Cebu’s political 
field as accommodations for reform grassroots- politics.  This 
is a hybrid form of politics that is somewhat clientelistic and 
not necessarily ultra-reformist.  Perhaps, this is the best that 
they can be for the time being.  
Here, the doxa of reform gate keepers are major habitus 
of those who are at the core of community service, leading 
towards achievement of community goals such as freedom 
from the perennial threat of demolition, and the achievement 
of welfare amenities (i.e., public housing for the poorest of the 
poor families along danger zones; public healthcare for the 
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sick and senior citizens; public education for the young and 
deserving youths).  
The doxa of hybridity or multiplicity is drawn from 
grassroots reform politicians’ praxis.  Some still ride on or 
accommodate trapo practices in what Bourdieu’s work calls 
doble verite while some are gradually weaning their 
communities away from patronage politics and trapo electoral 
practices like the cabo, the lansaderas, and the inangayan.    
Other political practices either reinforce or hinder 
informed actions of political reforms in the field by way of 
symbolic exchanges on issues of trapo practices of other 
politicians.  In a way, this kind of undertaking reflects 
enabling and constraining factors in the practices of politics in 
the field.   In Cebu City’s case, gatekeepers also serve as a 
bridge between articulators and their community for the latter 
to establish connections witharchetypes.  Some gate keepers 
build up teams in their communities or set up committee 
systems for purposes of accommodating outside politicians 
such as archetype politicians and other articulators at the city 
council.  When the archetypes approach them for support 
during election time, they would subdivide the barangay and 
assign one team to accommodate an outsider trapo politician 
and find out what benefits they can get from him.   
The doxa for reform politics develops from a circular 
reinforcement of local practices, such as exchanges of local 
texts, and constant engagement in local issues, (such as the 
cabo system, “vigilantism,” demolition of communities after 
failure to pay CMP and arson of communities) that strengthen 
or weaken the foundation of all grassroots reform collective 
beliefs expressed in terms of local language, metaphors, and 
actions.  Hence, the self-evidence of the social condition for 
reforms in the political field are being reduplicated through 
instituted discourses about new politics in Cebu. This is 
regularly accompanied by an exemplar.   
The classic examples of trapo lexicons such as: cabo,
lansaderas and the inangayan systems of trapo politics are 
embedded in the field and floated as evidences of a political-
culture now embossed into politics for a period of time.  From 
long labors of politicians in the field, these terms are 
historically produced and are used, practiced, lived by and 
accepted, knows no “disenchantment” (Bourdieu, 1960) and 
made it a tacit order of things given in the political field.  The 
concepts and/or the practice known as the cabo system,
lansaderas and inangayan are now part of a ritual of practices, 
of discourses, sayings, or proverbs that are all structured in 
concordance with the principles of the corresponding habitus 
of the Cebuano trapo politicians.  That their distinction and 
identification falls within the realm of trapo is in itself a 
revelation that there exists an unholy alliance between 
twoopposing doxas that support each other although they are 
against each other.  The relationship is a unification of 
opposites that blurs the line separating the realms of reform 
politicians and trapo (traditional politicians). 
Hence, what is the deeper meaning of a trapo system? 
The trapo system is but a system understood to be the 
mechanism where uncontrived masses in communities accept 
what big politicians offer, provided the deal carries with it a 
justification or legitimizing factor  that usually comes into the 
form of pecuniary consideration for  gatekeepers and for the 
poor unemployed people in the community.  However, the 
community folks are also intelligent enough to recognize the 
degree of exploitation to which the trapo subjected them. Fully 
aware that they being treated like a pool of enslaved 
constituents who are being used by trapos in exchange for a 
few cash, these folks they pull off their counter-maneuver by 
maximizing their takes and at the same time under delivering 
the votes thereby shortchanging the trapo in the deal.  For 
instance, some community folks talked one trapo candidate 
into shelling out P1,000 inangayan at the last minute in the 
last elections.  They took the money and decided to properly 
divide it and distribute in equal shares among the voters in 
their community. But the voters were still given the free hand 
in choosing their candidates to vote. A number but not all, of 
them voted for Osmeňa.  
While it is true that there is a gradual emergence of 
reform, it is likewise admitted that the trapo system still 
prevails and has not been totally eradicated although it is 
constantly counter-checked by a gradually emerging discourse 
of reform among grassroots-gatekeeper-politicians in the field. 
Why does trapo prevail?  
 Trapo prevails because, at the moment, the hybrid structure
needs to sustain itself through the interdependent relations
of gate keepers, articulators and archetypes. There is no
other logical and more durable arrangement that sustains
the political field except for this kind of mutuality between
and among players.  It is not the individual players that
count as decisive here, but the structure that inter-locks
each other’s position in the field and that accounts for its
legitimacy and logicality. If one component gets extracted
from this formation, the whole political system will surely
breakdown and the Cebuano political structure and
political culture get disentangled.
 There are various forms of dramaturgies that reform
politicians have utilized for their claims of selfhood as they
get embedded in their respective fields of social relations.
The researcher appropriates Bourdieu’s theory of praxis as
expressed in the native concept “diskarte.”  This is because
the politician as public servant makes it a point to sustain
various roles in the various stages, and spaces of the social
conditions.  If one looks at the contemporary condition of
politics and politicians, one may see the character of some
‘slimy’ objects [the conscious players in the field,
according to Pilario, resort to ruses in order to hide or
dissimulate their character flaws].  Because politics and
politicians in Cebuano language is always in the norm
called “minaru” or “minarunong”which means the act of
being scheming which makes it difficult for one to
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properly figure out the motives, ways, and characters of the 
actor who wanted to hide them.  But for politicians, the 
condition is dependent on one’s ability to make “diskarte” 
which is referred to as their “cunning intelligence.  The 
term applies to those who have the ability to adjust and 
readjust quickly into positionalities, according to one’s 
ability to fit into the situation or move swiftly according to 
challenges in the field.  And so are the reform politicians, 
who have learned the art of politics morphing, enabling 
them to change and readjust their positionand dispositions 
in a reasonable and legitimate manner in the changing 
times.   
The capability to diskarte is the ability to fit into the 
changing conditions of society where political actions 
serve as responses to situations that challenge politician’s 
difficult position.  At times, this appears like a bluff but at 
the same time it is what legitimizes the bluff into a 
necessary form of political action.   The diskarte  is often 
resorted toby politicians in order to avoid embarrassment, 
trouble,or shame. Hence, diskarte  is sometimesconsidered 
a means to slip away or make a cunning move to extricate 
one’s self from a compromising situation, or unflattering 
controversy in which he or she is involved. Diskarte  is 
also used  when there are necessary political actions to be 
undertaken in order to satisfy an obligation that may 
challenge ones social position but cannot be satisfied 
automatically within a period of time. In Cebu’s political 
field is the cabo system as diskarte, as lansaderas  and 
inangayan systems are all but forms of diskarte.  Hence, 
politics becomes more of the manner how politicians do 
their diskarte to keeps them in the limelight or to best 
sustain their legitimacy and attract their constituents who 
must keep them in power idefinitely. 
Archetypes, wittingly or unwittingly, provide the 
articulators and gate keepers the chance for the latter to 
apply their diskarte that serve to advance their respective 
interests; votes for the archetype politicians, are chances at 
city office for articulators and preservation of barangay 
leadership for gate keepers.  But, given its nature, chance is 
momentary.  So are the gains of gate keepers in the scheme 
of things.  
Hence, the concept of “chance” although it is quite an 
absurd space for a positionality that is only involved in a 
very specific moment, the moment or chance is why the 
local metaphor called diskarte  is likened to the Greek 
concept  “phronesis” [practical wisdom] based on the 
work of Greek Philosopher Aristotle in his Nicomachean 
Ethics.[6]   In the Aristotlean text, phronesis refers to the 
true and genuine skills of everyday practice that makes a 
system of habitus  [hexis or habit of character,  in
Bourdieu the concept “habitus”]appear like second nature 
to a person. It becomes a skill which at first is only served 
as a balancing tool until he develops the capability to see 
through and influence the scheme of things beyond his self, 
given his repeated exposures to situations of chances or in 
unexpected moments that require a necessary action. 
Hence, this moments of chance sometimes involve the 
ability for “metis”to mean cleverness, and/or cunning 
intelligence that, according to Aristotle,  is integral to all 
conditions of the duality of truths [dual face/Greek term is
“doble virite”].  And that is why diskarte [phronesis] may 
not necessarily be metic or cunning intelligence [metis] or 
vice versa, and conversely.  Cunning intelligence may not 
be diskarte[phronesis] if one of the other [metis] is not 
present in it. (Aristotle, NE 6.5 1140b2-5).    
In other words, Phronesis may be taken as some 
reasonable skill born out of hexis or habit of character that 
Bourdieu coins out in his work as habitus. Habitus just like
Diskarte is what triggers one to act according to calculated 
risks of deliberating whether an action is dangerous or just 
appropriate for a given “moment of chance”.  Diskarte
may also correspond to the Greek word  metis  [cleverness] 
that in Greek concept corresponds to the notion of  “double 
face” [doble virite/dual truths].  Thus, diskarte as an act 
privileged by habitus cannot be entirely or simply put as 
phronetic or metic but is somehow a combination of  both 
phronesis [practical wisdom] and metis [cleverness]. 
On the other hand, the so-called “diskarteng pulitiko”is 
the manner in which leader- politicians such as the 
grassroots gatekeepers, public interest articulators and 
archetype politicians handles, with the use of skills or 
strategy, certain issues, actuations and challenges that 
confront them or the community. Each political leader has 
his own “diskarteng pulitiko” consciously or 
unintentionally acquired through experience in the 
community.  In its varied ways, “diskarteng pulitiko” is a 
by-product of circumstances in his political life that shapes 
his individual self [a self configuration], a  transformation 
of the self [self transfiguration] and /or that repeated 
transformation  [self reconfiguration] being politician 
leader and public servant at the same time (Ricouer in J. 
Dunne 1995, 21:137-157). This might be taken in from the 
metaphorical sense from the life stories of politicians. It 
could be an appropriation of a chapter of the lives of 
politicians in which they intertwined in the positions of 
power  gate keepers and articulators both serve as enabling 
mechanisms for the former. These system may be referred 
to as political positions in the forced field analysis.  All 
these three positions interlock with each other and is so 
embedded with each other’s structure that extracting one 
away will dismantle the whole field. But this happens only 
if there is a unification of a theme that runs through the 
[6]Aristotle states in his Necomachean Ethics:  “Practical wisdom, on the other 
hand is concerned with things human and things about which it is possible to 
deliberate; for we say this is above all the work of the man of practical 
wisdom, to deliberate well, but no one deliberates about things that cannot be 
otherwise, nor about things which have not an end, and that a good that can be 
brought about by action.  The man who is without qualification good at
deliberating is a man who is capable of aiming in accordance with calculation 
at the best for man of things attainable by action.  Nor is practical wisdom
concerned with universals only it must also recognize the particulars; for it is 
practical and practice is concerned with particulars.”  NE 6.7, 1141b8-16.
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lives of each individual in the story of the forced field, of 
tacit agreements that play part of the contests of symbolic 
powers. 
Here the term diskarte also refers to the researcher’s 
neologism for the praxis or the “act of poaching in the 
field” undertaken by gate keepers in their efforts to gain 
space within the political playing field of the ever 
traditional political field still dominated by dynastic 
families to date.  Conversely, getting the dynastic 
politicians to accommodate the articulators in the former’s 
political party is the latter’s diskarte to be able to get a post 
or political position in the field of power.  The culture of 
the new breed of politicians (the gate keepers and the 
articulators), in their historical experience embodied in 
them as distinct from the practices of trapo politicians who 
are entrenched in the political field.  
Diskarte in this study is seen as a process of 
concealment of interests in the field rather than a form of 
revelation of their interest because reform politicians act 
simply by poaching in order to gain ground and handle 
power by means of misrecognition and other tacit means.  
Politics is a semi-autonomous field defined by class 
relations and domination.  Here, the changing conditions of 
time, of power, and of legitimation demand a certain kind 
of creativity to respond to the challenges of the field.  The 
cunning intelligence of gate keepers or that of articulators 
are seen through their ability to adjust to changing and 
vacillating conditions that require an element of bluff or 
deception in their actions to make their actions appear 
appropriate and justifiable in the given instance.  For 
Filipino politicians, such ability for diskarte has been 
proven true mostly in cases that expose or might expose 
them to public shame and conflict of interests.  It is 
situations like these that confront their ability to decide and 
make sound or cunning choices.  Thus, the local term 
diskarte is understood as a strategy of concealment to save 
oneself from the occasions of shame or embarrassment.  
On the other hand, diskarte is also employed in situations 
where certain concerns require urgent actions, but there is not 
enough time and resources, (not to mentionlack of ability to 
meet legal obligations or requirements) to achieve as certain 
objective at a given time. 
Diskarte is also understood as the normative aspect of 
Bourdieu’s practice when Bourdieu took off from MacIntyre’s 
(1985) statement that practice is a set of human activities 
through which goods or end results distinctively defined by 
such activities are achieved.  This set of activities, in a 
way,also extend to a kind of standard performative skill and/or 
standard of excellence in the performance of this set of 
activities that corresponds to the defined standard end result 
(MacIntyre 1985: 187). For instance, a politician may be 
motivated to perform well as a public servant due to the 
economic rewards that he gains from his services.  However, 
only when he performs his sworn duties well, out of true sense 
of commitment to the genuine love of public service can he 
truly be a real practitioner of politics. Thus, comes the 
distinction between what Aristotle calls poiesis and praxis.
The former is an act of doing a thing for a cause other than 
itself, while the latter speaks of an act done for its own sake. 
That is why for ordinary gatekeepers, to enter into political 
practice, they have to accept the standards of excellence 
according to authorities in the field of politics, such as their 
mentor cadre activists, and to accept their inadequacies and 
incompetence.  In the same way, one should have the proper 
attitudes, values orientations, and practices to enable one to 
make judgment, decisions, and actions consistent to the 
current standards of social justice in political practice.  Like 
other fields, the standards of practice in politics, or in the field 
of development and activism had had long histories before 
they cannot to be defined as social fields. 
On the other hand, the habitus of a politician defines the 
manner and conduct in which he asserts political settlements 
and legitimation in everyday life. Given the crisis situation in 
Cebuano politics, and as reflected in the literature, the 
embodied Cebuano political culture in the history of its praxis, 
is characterized as that of: a.) warlordism; b.) machine politics 
and neo-patrimonialism;  c.) neo-patriarchalism in networks of 
patrons as social capital; and d.) political dynamics through 
coercive electoral schemes.  Its remarkable evidence is the 
historically-established cabo networks of the supra-sitio, 
supra-baranganic structures of the lower class masses in their 
respective villages and the lansaderas chain-of-cheating-
ballot-switching mechanisms coupled with the long history of 
the inangayan-vote-buyingscheme.  This is where barangays 
are subdivided into smaller cells of registered precinct voters 
organized parallel to the sitio-based precinct household 
clusters for purposes of insuring election alignments.  Local 
kingpins establish sitio-based cabo leaders who enlist or enroll 
these households reflected in the voters’ list at the precincts 
for them to provide the perks in exchange for their votes 
during elections.  The cabo system is regularly reactivated 
during election time and is deactivated thereafter leaving only 
selected sitio or barangay cabo leaders are sustained all 
throughout the political period. 
Meanwhile, the emergent reform politicians rely on setting 
up various political machines that may appear like patrimonial 
and uneven in some way, but are actually people-oriented, 
face-to-face, personalized alternative structures of formal and 
semi-formal networks. These alternative organizations are of 
equal, rather than feudal, relations replicating mass 
organizations as political structures for the purpose of securing 
extensive people’s participation in governance that used to be 
marred by the patron-client relationship, the political machine, 
patrimonialism and bossism of old. In short, its habitus is 
grounded as the alternative to the cabo system in a way that 
makes direct democracy work in the actual field.  This is how 
mass organizations and institutions of public service, as 
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alternative empowerment centers for the poor and the 
deprived, came to being.  
F. Validating the Hypotheses
The study further affirms the following hypotheses:  
 Some reform gate keepers of the past two decades are
recruited not from traditional political families, but
from groups involved in mass movements and similar
socio-civic networks that strongly fought against the
Marcos dictatorship and see that there is no other way
to assert change but through actual participation in
mass movements at the grassroots level;
 That reform gate keepers are not the articulate or
ideologue type of mass leaders from the left who can
provide theoretical bases for their actions as they
were not trained to be ideologues in the movement
and it was not their preoccupation to engage in
theorizing but they do claim that their origin and
exposure to such movements and networks have
become the source of their anti- land-lord, and anti-
political dynasty sentiments, practices and conducts
of political norm and political dynamics in public
office;
 That reform gate keepers are not from ranks of
hardcore leftist activists in Cebu City. They are but
ordinary members of the people’s mass movements
of the left;
 That reform gate keepers introduce democratic and
participatory approaches ranging from personalized
consultations, collective action, collective sharing of
resource base, mass consultations, people’s
initiatives, and other democratic civil society-
oriented reforms;
 That reform gate keepers gradually establish
barangay to home-based and sitio-based collective
alternative structures as schemes of interest
articulation for civil society groups that can compete
with structures of traditional politics, e.g. cabo
system, small-town boss, district boss, and others to
secure votes needed to make them win in public
office during elections;
 That for as long as genuine assets redistribution and
felt needs of the people are not met, these parallel
structures of civil society pursue their interest to push
for continued political reforms so that emergent
reform gate keepers have reason to exist and sustain
its position in public office;
 That reform gate keepers somehow combine their
new politics with some personalistic politics
associated with traditional politics as a norm in
public office.  They, too, make use of clientelistic
practices although at the minimal level of felt needs
redistribution ;
 That some social connectivity between trapo and gate
keepers exists, such as the relationship between trapo
archetype politicians with reform public interest
articulators and reform-grassroots progressive 
gatekeepers at the barangay level allowing pragmatic 
coexistence of some hybridized-multiple strands of 
politics to continue; and  
 That these emergent grassroots reform gatekeeper
politicians and their politics though only at a minimal
level, still contribute to the development of a concept
of “political change in Cebu City’s local politics.”
CONCLUSION 
Based on aforementioned political relations and political 
behavior that have unfolded in the field, one can see a parallel 
development of institutions that is determined “by the
system’s capacity to adapt to changing environments in order 
to maintain itself” (Pertierra 1988: 12; Sandschneider 1995). 
The Cebuano political field is quite permeable, what with its 
own mechanisms and sets of political settlements and elite 
bargains that have to be maintained to sustain itself.  This is 
still called “Institutionalism” although it fails to attach an 
independent role for particular institutions such as the role of 
gatekeepers as against articulators and against executive 
archetype in the city government.  This is because one 
component structure is dependent on the other, such that it 
cannot operate the moment it is removed from its interlocking 
mechanism. 
However, from the statist perspective of political 
sociology, the researcher finds it not enough to consider 
Blondel’s (1973) “Old Institutionalism” with purely historical 
and legalistic description (Blondel 1973:23), to speak for 
Cebuano politics.  This is because Cebuano politics goes 
beyond historical and legalistic premises.  The researcher 
considers this more of a kind under Neo-Institutionalist school 
where dependent and independent variables are taken into 
account.  Cebuano politics has had institutions that affect 
distribution and redistribution of resources, and influence 
political meanings.  Such institutions also create norms and 
rules that shape preferences, choices, and behavior of political 
actors in a manner where there is interdependency among 
subgroups, such as gate keepers in relation to articulators and 
archetypes and vice-versa.   There are particular institutions 
that play both roles of cause and effect (Martin and Simons 
1998: 743).  Incrementally, Cebuano institutions such as gate 
keepers, articulators and archetypes become more than just a 
field of social forces aggregating excessive amounts of 
societal interests and political action.  They appear as 
collective actors for political change (March and Olsen 1984: 
738).  Like, the gate keeper nature cannot stand on its own 
without the given institution of articulators whose duality 
outlasts the extent of the character of the archetype institution in 
public office.  
The researcher finds this neo-institutionalism expressive of 
the conditions in Cebu since it concurs with fundamental 
importance of designs, like system of government, elections, 
and representation (Stepan and Skach 1993 :1; Diamond 1997: 
xxii; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997: 2.; Roper 2002 : 253). 
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Here is a field that belongs to institutionalism like the cabo
system, the lansaderas and the inangayan in the Cebuano 
political field. 
Thus, looking into the designs of political institutions in 
Cebu City, such as in terms of a.) political norm; and b.) 
political dynamics, from the perspective of neo-
institutionalism, the study concludes that here comes a 
mutually dependent relationship between social structure 
[cabo system] and the political actors [gate keepers, 
articulators and archetypes] in Cebu City’s local government 
units.   
Furthermore, the researcher found out how in Cebu comes 
Neo-Institutionalism as a renewed interest in institutional and 
“constitutional engineering” (Sartori 1994) along with 
Bourdieu’s sociological concept “habitus” as the reflexivist 
dimension, while asserting the norm of a symbolic field of 
political change as endogenous.  In this case, a kind of 
multiplicity and hybridity of the institutions serve as 
conclusion, after finding out how cabo leaders are likewise 
transformed into reform-grassroots-gatekeeper-politicians and 
then embedded back into the political field as integral political 
institutions or as independent variables or collective actors. 
But still, in the Neo-Institutionalist’s school, the process of 
political change appears hazy, if not fragmented, slow or too 
mechanical.  True Cebuano political culture and practice can 
be viewed through different lenses. Now what lens appropriate 
and more generative-reflexivist in “habitus” that draws out 
processes and moments of political change from interactions 
within a framework of norms?  Here the actor [gate keepers] 
improvises the political dynamics via his/her assimilation into 
new institutions or structures as he/she engages in the practice. 
As the actor becomes determined and effective, spill-over 
effects on other institutions foster changes in the political 
culture.  While institutions change the values and attitudes of 
political decision-makers, the Cebuano society also gets 
redefined as a consequence of these decisions.  Eventually, 
with changes in resource allocation [urban lands] also comes 
changes in the redistributive properties of resources other than 
what was previously experienced and which, over time, 
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